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Review of Venusa Tinyi's book by Aribam Uttam Sharma Aribam Uttam Sharma Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University Dec 28, 2023 Book review of Venusa Tinyi's On the Foundational Concepts of Norms and Normative Systems (Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, 2023) The author, Venusa Tinyi, makes a case that formalizations that aim to clarify normative concepts like obligation, permission, and prohibition that have a bearing on our actions are inadequate. Based on this claim, the book offers to make amends by proposing a model that offers an alternative approach. The book assumes that there is more to logic than its concern for truth. If logic is understood as a language and the business of language is more than making assertions (Austin 1962), then it should not surprise us that logic's concern cannot be contained by the concern for truth. This wider concern now accorded to logic plays out in the book's take on the prescription/description distinction. Here, the distinction incarnates as that between "What ought to be the case" and "What ought to be done". Whether the logic of norms ought to be theoretical or practical in intent forms a motivational undercurrent of the book. At the center of logic is the notion of logical consequence, i.e., what follows from what. Deontic logic deals with the theoretical interests of how normative concepts contribute and act in logical consequence (McNamara and Putte 2022) . Since normative concepts are supposed to inform our actions, any study of them has to be sensitive to their pragmatic aspect. Thus, deontic logic inherits something of the tension between the prescriptive and descriptive in classical logic. Tinyi rehearses the problems inherent in the formalization of normative concepts and the logic of norms, especially deontic logic. He asserts that there is no aspect of deontic logic that is not fraught with difficulties. He gives attention to von Wright-Anderson debate on the attempts to reduce deontic logic to alethic modal logic. He does this to show that such reduction is futile. Jorgensen’s dilemma , which arises due to the difficulty of reasoning about norms within truth-functional logical apparatus, drives home this point. The particular difficulty encountered in interpreting negation prefixed to an act category also suggests that the logic of norms is a different beast altogether from other standard forms of logic. Deontic logic has been identified as modal logic (Sider 2010) . Yet, drawing parallels between it and other well-known modal systems is ungainly. The author notes that the Axiom of Reflexivity , which says that necessity implies actuality, cannot be adopted in deontic logic. An act, which is obligatory (read as necessary), need not be performed (read as actualized) with or without the pain of punishment. At least in this world, sinners do escape punishment. Around this difficulty, and on the question of the externality of sanction to norms, H. L. A. Hart’s critique of Hans Kelsen and J. L. Austin is given an exposition. The author enters these debates to stress that values, desires, and intentions cannot be divorced from norms. Any formalization, analysis, or reduction that attempts this divorce is deemed inadequate. The author forays into the nature of legal systems. von Wright, the pioneer of modern deontic logic, and whom the author credits for inspiring his book, erred, according to the author, when he tried to analyze deontic terms through legal terms like immunity, liability, punishment, and so on. The author takes this failure as a sign that deontic concepts do have an "axiological" tint that cannot be done away with without making it grate against our intuition. Difficulties and inadequacies give impetus for developments and corrections. This applies to the development of logic too. When one finds problem in the formalization of a domain of reasoning, the usual course of action can either be i) augmentation of the expressive power of the initial formalism, if the fault lies in the inadequacy of expressive power of the said formalism or ii) replacement or modification of the initial formalism, if there is a fundamental problem with the initial formalism itself (McNamara and Putte 2022) . Tinyi finds that the problem with the logic of norms (deontic logic) is of a fundamental kind. So, the book sets out to make amends by replacing/modifying the initial formalism. But he takes this amendment in a novel way. For the same reason, this is a high-stakes approach. When he proposes a quasi-theoretical or quasi-formal model named D-Model , he avoids overhauling the semantics of existing formalism that he has found faulty i.e., modal logic. Rather, he provides a model, which would capture our intuition about basic normative concepts that in one way or the other formed the conceptual base of hitherto existing formalisms. The heart of the book lies in the author's development of D-model that captures our intuitions about normative concepts and the roles they play in the normative aspects of our lives. The proposal is based on the author's conviction that the semantic tools meant for propositional logic (descriptive expressions) cannot determine the significance of deontic expressions. Here the book traces a genealogy of ideas that led to D-model. In this vicinity, a bit of caution is called for. In the D-model context, the reader must be ready to modify the standard understanding of models associated with the semantics of logical systems. And again, since there is already a well-known model called Model-D in modal logic, care could be taken not to mistake the D-model for its more famous kin. The construction of D-Model takes cues from possible world semantics. The basic normative concepts that play central roles in deontic logic are analyzed and put in relation through attendant concepts that are developed around this construction. Deontic heaven, deontic hell, repressive norms, restorative norms, and prospective norms are some of these attendant concepts. There are times one might feel that the author's focus on the analysis of normative concepts pays scant attention to questions of validity, proof procedures, soundness and completeness. But this relegation, to defend the author's intent, is understandable. The author takes D-Model to be "metaphorical". It is not intended to be part of a formal structure that would be prescriptive of normative reasoning. Metaphor, the author observes, is to be judged by the degree of illumination it affords. Measuring by this yardstick, D-model provides illumination on some alternate pathways to understand the core concepts operative in deontic logic, the logic of norms, and our intuitions about these concepts. Through the notion of a deontological gap — the difference between worlds like ours, and the worlds that we would like to be in — the purpose and significance of norms are analyzed as that which induce the narrowing of such gaps. Tinyi gives reasons for not amending the problems of deontic logic with a different formal apparatus. Logical principles, which were once considered unassailable — for example, the traditional laws of thought —- have been challenged via formalisms in which they are locally or globally made to break down. We find this in the logical treatments of paraconsistency, intuitionism, possibilism (Mortensen 1989) . The author cites this fact to warrant the novel approach he takes. Another, perhaps better, reason for this novelty, which the author mentions, is the difficulties that are engendered by a model-theoretic approach to the semantics of deontic logic. These are unique to deontic logic and are not encountered in other standard logical systems. Russell once said to Wittgenstein, "Are you thinking about logic or about your sins?" "Both," Wittgenstein replied (Russell 1968). One could take Wittgenstein's reply as an affirmation of a deep link between logic and ethics. The logic of norms therefore has held interests not only to logicians but also to those concerned by how one should act. Those with interests in logic, ethics, legal studies, the history of philosophy, and their interfaces would find Tinyi’s book engaging and rewarding. References Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words . Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. McNamara, Paul and Frederik Van De Putte, "Deontic Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/logic-deontic/ Mortensen, Chris. 1989. "Anything Is Possible." Erkenntnis (30): 319-337. Russell, Bertrand. 1968. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1914-1944 . Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Sider, Theodore. 2010. Logic for Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richa Shukla In conversation with Madhvi Prasad (PhD Scholar, University of Mumbai) May 2022 Dr. Richa is Assistant Professor at Jindal Global Business School. She did her M.Phil. on Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy. The dissertation was titled as : Webs of Identity: A Relationship between Self and Others in Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy. Her PhD was on Feminist Phenomenology. Its titled as: Dialogues in Silence: A Study of Mourning, Shame and Vulnerability in India. Her theoretical leanings goes for Feminist Philosophy, Existentialism, ethics and social and political philosophy. She has numerous peer reviewed publications under her name. She has presented her work and given talks in many international and national conferences. She has worked on few international reserach projects on gender disparity. Dr Shukla is a certified philosophical counsellor from the American Philosophical Association. Dr. Shukla is one of the founders of Collective for women philosophers in India(CWPI). She is also the member of History of Women Philosophers and Scientists (HWPS) Madhvi : Greetings, Dr Richa. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. The first thing I'd like to know about you is your background, varied interests, education, beliefs, motivation and challenges that prompted you to pursue advanced studies in philosophy as well as convey these vibes through your teaching career. Richa : Well as a Philosopher I doubt if I have a very strong sense of belongingness. So I still struggle when people ask me where I belong to? Bombay (currently Mumbai ) and Benaras played a very integral role while shaping me as a human being. I did my education largely from JNU, New Delhi. There's a way educational institutes like JNU affect you. It drills your mind to understand reflection and critical thinking. Mine was no less different. As a young woman when I entered JNU with my set of preconceived notions, it asked me who am I? And the answer to this question continues… Because of the privileges of being born in a certain family, education was given priority above everything and anything. Hence, reading fiction, Hindi, English, and Marathi literature was an everyday affair. In hindsight, when I think of it, reading as a habit was passed on to me by my previous generation. As a result, my family introduced me to Kathak, classical singing. The latter I recognized I wasn't cut for. Kathak brought a certain sense of aesthetics to my life. My generation is the third generation to act as arbitrators, and attorneys hence it was a tough call to not choose the law and think about Philosophy. I see Philosophy as a partner who never abandons you, especially during your challenging times. It stays with you, by you. One of the larger Philosophical questions which I am working on is the idea of the gender gap in the Indian philosophical domain. This has been one of the challenges which I faced while reading Philosophy as a woman of color. I see how the metropolitan city has influenced you to broaden your thinking and, of course, to choose philosophy. The JNU culture has undoubtedly instilled creativity in you, and Kathak art has ingrained aesthetic principles in you. So, my question for you is concerning gender roles and how you describe your contributions to promoting gender equality in society, particularly through the implementation of values such as diversity, openness, and aesthetics. Well to be honest it's not only the cosmopolitan nature of a particular city which has broadened my thinking solely. I am thankful for the cultural capital which I have received being born in a family like mine where there's a lot of intersectionality. My Father to be more precise is the most amazing Philosopher I have seen in my life. He influenced me to pursue Philosophy. I guess the relationship between Philosophy and Law is an interesting one which reshaped my perception of doing Philosophy. But you are right about other aspects here. I think I have a two-fold response to your question. About promoting gender equality, I feel Public Philosophy is a very important tool these days. That's why I categorically started to write in popular tabloids. It helps to share your opinion, and offer multiple perspectives and also solutions. One of the steps taken in this direction came alive when we formed the Collective for Women Philosophers in India . One of the structural differences which can be bought out would be via making more inclusive courses, pedagogies should be directed as such where inclusion, gender diversity and aesthetics should intersect with each other. Heartfelt congratulations on your initiative to support Indian women philosophers. I am sure that it will restore the status and value in a society that women seek. Secondly, while your arguments made about reforming curriculum and pedagogy are fascinating, it is sometimes problematic. The reason is the increasing concerns about the accessibility of educational resources to women who are marginalized, especially rural women living in remote parts. How do you connect such inequalities to the concept of intersectionality? It's a valid observation Madhavi, I must say. But when I answered your question I was specifically speaking about the academic world and its accessibility, and how it can be more diversified in nature. I remember when I got admitted to JNU, I came across this concept called marginalized points or quartile points. It's a simple concept which believes that people come from diverse backgrounds and those who hail from complex social structures should be given advances ahead of others. I was fascinated by this concept. Hence the Canon of JNU was very diversified. It's like you become special because of your differences. I wish we could have more egalitarian steps like these where participation and accessibility can walk together. Getting back to your question, I feel inequality and intersectionality are very closely related to each other. It's like making a puzzle. As I said earlier, more egalitarian steps can help us to build the bridge, also something I realized since I started teaching is that a lot of people have taboos associated with the great rural and urban divide. There should be more dialogue to demystify this myth. I'm delighted you're addressing accessibility and participation in the teaching profession because students confront difficulties in both areas. Aside from that, you mentioned the rural-urban divide. Could you please share some suggestions for closing the gaps? Also, you expressed your personal opinions on the favourable effects of politics, demography, gender, racial, and migratory terms on your career as a philosopher. Do you have any recommendations for people who are experiencing negative effects as a result of the influence of all of the above-mentioned terms? Such as a female student who, despite having promising academic qualifications, is struggling for scholarships and resource accessibility due to her gender, financial status, demography, and migrations. Wonderful question Madhvi. Let me use an everyday example to answer your question. I see marginalization as a Bombay sandwich. Those who are and have stayed in Bombay understand, that it's multiple layers, a few we like, a few we do not. It has multiple layers. By removing one layer, you cannot expect that you got the sandwich you want to consume. Let's try understanding the web of marginalization through this metaphor. In the case of marginalization, all these layers intersect with each other. Hence, your point is very valid. Dialogue on all levels is the key to bridging the gap. There should be discomforting dialogues in families, classrooms, cafes and whatnot. Remember, feminists struggled when they said personal is political. It's important that the elephant in the room gets addressed. Secondly, there should be more policies, and scholarships to bridge the gap between these two spheres. And most importantly, more sensitization programs to help people unlearn. Unlearning the preconceived notions is the key here. Unlearning the feudal ways of looking and existing. The example of a female student which you gave could also be understood as a form of resistance, that despite every hindrance she is trying her level best. Even though the gatekeepers of morality are trying their level best to keep her silent and marginalized. I wish there could be more institutes like JNU which offers another world, another perspective, another kind of training and which give strength to all kinds of voices. And of course unless and until policies and dialogues would not happen it won't make sense. Thanks for bringing the solution so vibrantly. My next question is a bit personal. What would you do if a colleague said something racist, misogynistic, prejudiced, or otherwise offensive to you, or if you witnessed someone dealing with these issues? What stand would you take? Also, How will you encourage diversity, equality, and inclusion among your subordinates? Well, you have to corner and confront people all the time. Though it depends on whether I would use humour, satire, a movie example or whatsoever. You see, showing a mirror is important. But don't blame me, if you don't like what you see. Well, ideally I believe it should be taken care of by the institute itself. But I will share this exercise which I always do with my students. It's a social experiment called privilege walk. Here, I ask all of them to stand in a line and with the yes to each question they have to come forward, and with a no, they take a step back. It highlights exclusively the gender gap, social exclusion, etc. I usually have a Playlist of certain scenes from movies (Regional, Hindi and English) which I share with them. I think engagement is essential. That’s a superb idea and l think other people should also implement such important moves to promote diversity, equality and inclusion. Apart from this, I am also highly impressed by your teaching styles. Could you describe more about it? Well, thank you Madhvi. Because I'm a Philosopher, dialogue has been a key in my classes too. I usually begin my lectures after playing a video/ some scenes from a popular show/ movie or song. After playing it, I usually ask the students what they think about it? I try to place one different opinion over another. Then I weave concepts and introduce philosophers. This becomes a really interactive way of doing theories and it reaches people too. Secondly, I always have this segment in my class once my class gets over. It's titled, Samjho Toh. ( try to understand) Here, I ask any student to come up with anything interesting they are reading/ listening/ painting etc. Sometimes students come with prose, poetry, a line from some story, a movie character, or a painting. It helps to understand their inner world and what they are thinking. It also helps in diversification in terms of thought processes. Once the student has shared, I ask for multiple perspectives. So far it's been working good. Fingers crossed! Thank you Dr Richa for participating so actively in this interview and for elegantly expressing your ideas. Your approach to philosophy would undoubtedly bring a meaningful change to this world. I wish you success in all of your upcoming endeavours.

Review of Meera Baindur's novel by Manish Sharma Manish Sharma Assistant Professor, Kurukshetra University Nov 24, 2023 Book review of Meera Baindur's Sharvay (Speaking Tiger, 2023) When it comes to women philosophers in India, Maitreyi, Gargi, Meera, and Sulabha come immediately to mind. However, these are little more than names, since their philosophies and lives are rarely discussed, let alone their teachings. We need stories of the women who devised wings, dared to take flight in the gusty winds of oppression, and sailed to otherwise forbidden heights. It is equally important to understand how they were bruised, how they grieved, and most importantly, how they failed. Sharvay is one such attempt that envisions the journey of a mixed caste (mishra varna) girl from the claustrophobic confines of a palace where she was born and brought up. The novel presents the concrete circumstances of the socio-cultural and historical setting of south-central India in the 8th century. It depicts the life of a human being of that era from one of the most vulnerable sections of its society and explores what it might be like for her to become a philosopher. Besides presenting the obstacles on the way to becoming a philosopher, the writer also suggests what kind of position that philosopher would take in the given situations. Spider Web around the Elephant Statue This novel explores the socio-economic circumstances from the viewpoint of a mishra varna woman. It was the era of Buddhist Rinpoche Padmasambhava, Sankara, and Dantidurga's uncle and successor, King Krishna. The story takes us through several locations, starting in the palace and concluding in a little town called Kolahalpur after passing through jungles and towns like Amravati. Born as a child of unknown parentage, Sharvay, the protagonist, was fostered by a woman in service of the Queen. She grew up alongside the haughty princess as herpeekadhari and socha-upcharika holding a silver spittoon in her hands for the princess to spit out her chewed betel leaves. Here, Sharvay shows first signs of curiosity as she wonders how the green leaves turn red upon chewing. However, her desire to learn was limited by her duties towards her mistress, the princess. She secretly stole knowledge as much as possible in circumstances that came her way accidentally. Since the pursuit and practice of knowledge were generally restricted. Even though all her faculties including her hands were growing more capable with time, she still wasn’t allowed to reach for anything beyond the spittoon. “Both Sharvay and Karmani grew within the palace like lengthening shadows in the setting sun”, writes Mansi (pen name used by Meera Baindur), depicting precisely the desolate condition of working women in a place. In the very beginning of the novel, Sharvay is shown preoccupied by the sight of a spider building a web across the large carving of an elephant on one of the pillars. And she thought, “Can a spider trap an elephant in a spider web?” In this metaphor, we may see that Sharvay was wondering about her fate. Would she, a feeble spider with her delicate web, tame and fetter the giant, elephant-like oppression of regime and social structures? Can she overcome the overarching constraints with her little efforts? The picture does not change much as Sharvay moves to a new town with the princess when the latter gets married, until she meets a fatal accident which proves to be a blessing in disguise. This accident freed her from the bondage of her mistress and the tethers of her previous identity as a mishra varna. She comes across an exciting chance to create a new identity, a new name, and a different role in life. So now, Sharvay was Kumbaja, an upper-caste woman and because she now found a foster father in a Vaidya, she was a healer and medicinal practitioner. Thereon, she finds a friend till her last in Bakumi, a partner in Madhavakara, and a guide in Tara (a Buddhist Bhikkhuni). The community of healers dwelling in the forest, of which her foster father was a part, saw frequent visits by travellers, healers, and philosophers. In the favoured social circumstances, she could chase after her long-drawn curiosities, although not without the challenges of being a woman. Gradually Sharvay learns and grows bold and ultimately starts to emit what she has absorbed. She embarks on a journey that tries to free knowledge from the stranglehold of a few and make it ubiquitous. Quest for Self-discovery In this novel, you'll be enthralled by a woman's bravery in defying all social conventions to venture into the uncharted realm of knowledge. You might discover that she can still get support from other women and forge an affiliation with them even under the direst of circumstances. This is the story of a woman's struggle, bravery, uncertain future, and release from the shackles of prevailing socioeconomic and cultural conventions. Sharvay embarks on a journey of philosophical development and lives her life with various identities and names to find integrity eventually. In the novel the issue of identity is raised when Sharvay wonders, “Why am I called 'peekadhari?'… Am I a person who does the work or has my work itself become me?" (Mansi, 2023, pp 98-99) No philosophy can remain untouched by the social, economic, and cultural circumstances of its time, rather these circumstances of the philosopher's life shape her philosophy. I have attempted to view this novel written by Mansi based on this thought. The beauty of the novel lies in its ability to depict the philosophical viewpoint through the protagonist's decisions and actions taken in different situations instead of relying on lengthy arguments. This novel will give you a taste of the famous philosophical debates called Shastrarthas and the influence of their patronage on their workings both from the public and the kings. If Shastrarthas were organized by public funding, they were under the pressure of being entertaining. However, if they were funded by kings’ money then they were influenced by the king’s religious or philosophical preference. The author expresses curiosity about having heard the names of numerous women philosophers in India's history but is unable to access their concrete lives and philosophical ideas. Hence, it becomes impossible to create a clear thought about their life choices and philosophies. In this novel, the author attempts to portray a clear image of one such female philosopher; how they would have dealt with the discourses and situations of their time. Freedom versus Social Structure At times, this novel reminds us of Sartre’s notion of freedom and suggests that humans always have the choice to be free. Let’s look at this line of the novel, “Every time she was called Peekadhari, she repeated 'Sarvamedhini' to herself. She wanted a name that described who she was and did not just represent what she did.” (Mansi, 2023, p.100) This way of thinking implies that, despite being in more impoverished circumstances, a person can overcome them by having the proper kind of self-image. In another instance, the debate between social conditions and the so-called spiritual awakening is raised in a very subtle way when the author comments on the working conditions of Sharvay, the peekadhari, and her adaptation to these conditions. The author writes: She had learned long ago that being mindful in these moments only caused her to be upset and angry. It was best to be mindless, except as needed to make her body obey other people's words. She had trained her mind to stay in an indifferent state. (Mansi, 2023, p.40) These lines hint towards what Erich Fromm calls 'the pathology of normalcy' which suggests that there are certain aspects in every society where pathological behaviour is normalized. In the above situation, being aware would be problematic for Sharvay as her working conditions do not allow it. Thus, while accepting the will to be free, the novel does not emphasize the unlimited capability of human freedom but rather suggests the limitations of freedom by the given choices. Moral Dilemma: Truth or Freedom? In this novel, along with accompanying Sharvay on her philosophical journey, you also set out on a philosophical journey of your own, reflecting on your obstacles, readiness, and mysteries. Numerous circumstances in her life would shock you and cause you to ponder. For me, this moment comes when Sharvay had to camouflage as an upper caste woman and as a man to participate in a debate on the truth and metaphysics. Let’s see her dilemma, when she talks to herself while hiding her caste from her saviours, "Should she tell these people everything and go back to her old life? Or should she be free now and take her steps into a new life, away from the limits of her past?" (Mansi, 2023, p.103) At this juncture, philosophical debates appear to be nothing more than a farce. It awakens us to our lack of ability to hear the truth. Many times, we turn a common phenomenon into a mystery by giving it a mythological shape and tend to forget the truth in that mystery. In this condition, Sharvay had to choose between truth or freedom and she chose freedom over truth as the society was not ready to listen to her truth. Dialogue with the Author The author's philosophical vision can be inferred from various instances in this novel. For example, the author wants to portray a picture of a woman philosopher, but for this work, she tries to raise those philosophical thoughts in the mind of the reader through her story. Although, many times, as a reader, it came to my mind that it would have been better if the philosophical debate initiated in the novel had been longer. The novel's plot implicitly raises philosophical questions at many points. It occasionally reminds us of Sophie’s World and suggests the possibility of a similar book in the context of Indian philosophy. When it comes to the author's philosophical assumptions, she has been very explicit on the significance of Apta Pramana but not limited to some special ones. She has also emphasized the body's epistemological significance numerous times. In this context, the author has acknowledged the significance of Ayurveda , which emphasizes observation as an epistemological tool. Besides, the author seems to value observation and analysis over philosophy's speculation. In addition, she believes that the kind of philosophical speculation, that reduces people to objects, is the cause of social inequity. In this novel, she investigates the possibility of the philosophy that places the human body and experience at its core and that may be developed based on the reality that each person encounters. If I examine the author's presumptions regarding the freedom of women, her picture of women's independence with the family appears challenging. She thus presents Sharvay's figure as being more independent without family. In addition, despite emphasizing the importance of the body, the author did not highlight the impact of pregnancy on a woman's life, though it is a significant part of a woman's physical life. One explanation for this would be that she considers this trait to be a weakness in women. I also find the kind of comradeship portrayed in the novel among the women, especially between Sharvay and Bakumi seems quite imaginary and imposed from our times. I believe this kind of comradeship was absent at that time even nowadays. This is the main reason, women have not been able to become a political pressure group in Indian political discourses yet. This novel was also interesting to me because it portrays a vivid picture of the historical cities of Central and South India which are completely new to me. It brings up some historical characters that I was unaware of, being a North Indian. It provides detailed pictures of the cities, their economies, artists, and artworks. There is an unknown thrill while reading this novel, especially the character of the Buddhist Bhikhuni, Tara, who has been presented in a very mysterious and attractive manner. The character of the protagonist, Sharvay, is also heartfelt and real. It has not been portrayed in an unnecessarily romantic style. This is the reason why the novel has been quite successful in highlighting the inhumanity prevalent in the society of that time. This work will be thought-provoking and interesting to philosophy students, anyone who is interested in issues about women, and to the readers of historical fiction. This book may make you reflect on a variety of subjects, including the veracity of existentialist philosophy, freedom, and potentiality, questions of identity and integrity, the advantages and disadvantages of public and private funding, etc.

A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist' Ariba Zaidi Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Zakir Husain Delhi College Feb 22, 2022 This article is part of the series of responses from philosophers on the hijab row . Through this piece of writing, my endeavour is to present my arguments to the Uniformist and the Reformist demonstrating that their attempts to get the practice of hijab banned are misplaced even if they have come to believe that their hearts are not. The term ‘Reformist’ here refers to the set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. The term ‘Uniformist’, on the other hand, refers to the section that believes the practice to be incompatible with the various symbols of uniformity (uniforms in the current context) that are instituted to promote equality and fraternity, and through them, arguably, unity in a diverse society such as ours. Why the uniformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable Given the current context and the likely grave implications that may follow, I would like to draw the attention of the Uniformist first. What does the symbol of uniformity represent? One may not disagree that the intent is to bring uniformity, but uniformity in itself doesn’t represent any merit in most societies unless it is a means to attain other social values, which are 'equality' and 'fraternity' and through such ideals 'unity' that binds the social fabric. My argument is – the spirit of uniformity is what gives meaning to the symbols of uniformity . Further, if a society is not able to appreciate what the spirit of uniformity means or what its significance is, and to what extent it can be pursued, the likely-hood of self-sabotaging the ends , i.e., equality, fraternity and unity for which such symbols of uniformity were instituted in the first place can’t be discounted. The spirit of uniformity is often mistaken to be seeking uniformity in all the spheres of social life. The error lies in not recognizing that not all domains of social life are equally amenable to a quest for uniformity. There are some domains where the quest for uniformity is a just and a meaningful pursuit, but there are also provinces where it cannot be accorded a justifiable place. Social, economic and political spheres are such domains where the quest for uniformity is arguably a legitimate pursuit. More so in the context of our society where economic and social hierarchies are deep-rooted, but regardless of the realities of a society, to have uniform basic minimum standards of dignified living, and absence of social hierarchies ought to be one of the prime objectives for any progressive society. Thus, the spirit of uniformity is a requisite quest in the foregoing domains. However, society is a union of more than these three stated sets. This brings me to the sphere of culture . Can we seek uniformity in the domain of culture, which in our society is composed of many diverse elements? Culture is a slightly different set than others, where each element (cultural element) of the set often happens to be the assumed identity of the ones who belong to that particular culture. For instance, should we seek uniformity in languages or dialects, in religion or its sub-sects, in rituals, customs and traditions etc.? Each of these elements can be a part of someone’s assumed identity. Any short-sighted attempt to dilute the integrity of such identities, as history indicates, are fraught with danger, often with detrimental effects to some of the goals for which the uniformity is sought in the first place, i.e., fraternity and through it unity in the society. Alternatively stated, uniformity becomes the instrument of sabotaging the same very goals to pursue which it was instituted in the first place. Thus, while instituting the symbols of uniformity such as uniforms, one ought to be guided by the spirit of uniformity, which is to strive for uniformity within the socio-politico-economic domains without undermining the diversity in the cultural domain . I am, therefore, urging all the Uniformists, who are in concurrence with the call for a hijab ban, to be guided by the spirit of uniformity. Otherwise, knowingly or unknowingly, they are grossly undervaluing the goals for which uniformity is sought. Why the Reformist insistence on the hijab ban is untenable The following sets of arguments are addressed to the Reformists, who, as I stated earlier, are those set of people who believe the practice of hijab or its imposition to be a regressive socio-cultural practice and therefore are calling for a prohibition by way of imposition. I don’t intend to keep the willful (autonomous) practice of hijab, with or without any justification, within the same bracket as the imposed or culturally-conditioned practice of it (even if some of the members fall within the intersection of the culturally-conditioned class and the autonomous class). The question is: Does the imposition of hijab or similar regressive practices regardless of their religious or cultural affiliation deserve a top-down imposition of ban or any other form of restriction? I agree with the Reformists that our society is a simmering ground of many regressive practices and arguably there is no religion that doesn’t contribute to it. It is significant for us, therefore, as a collective, to arrive at a generalization or a guiding framework to address such regressive issues and choose wisely when it comes to opting for a path to bring reforms. My attempt, through the following, is to demonstrate to the Reformists that a well-recognized framework already exists in most of the thriving democratic societies, and inference from such a framework doesn’t justify a top-down imposition of ban on hijab or similar practices. When it comes to socio-cultural reforms, one can immediately think of two preferred modes by most societies worldwide to carry out reforms viz., the consensus-based approach and the top-down impositions . One is likely to associate a consensus-based approach with a thriving democracy, but a top-down imposition isn’t entirely incompatible within a democratic political structure either. Of course, a consensus-based approach has to be the norm , but exceptions can be cited that often warrant a quick decision making, where waiting for consensus may prove to be debilitating. We have the instances of child marriage abolition, abolition of untouchability, the PNDT act, abolition of slavery in the US etc., where waiting for consensus would have proven self-defeating. I am inclined to keep abolition of sati too in this category although it was imposed by an imperialist regime. The question to be asked is what is the basis to determine whether a case for reform fits the consensus-based approach or the top-down imposition. The foregoing instances of top-down impositions and other similar incidents that have not found a mention here can probably be a promising source to inductively arrive at some generalization. In my humble attempt, I find that a breach of someone’s ‘right to life’ and ‘ right to live with dignity’ are two factors that provided the ground for impositions in all such instances. One may wish to keep disruption of peace and public order in this category, but it is also arguably one of the most misused basis by most governments to impose sanctions on our liberties. Thus, in my opinion, the breach of ‘right to life’ and ‘right to live with dignity’ seems to be the only basis for a top-down imposition in a democratic polity in most cases if not all. In all other contexts, a consensus-based approach should be the norm for any democracy to be meaningful to its citizenry. Now, the question is can school/college going hijab-wearing girls be seen as breaching any of these inalienable rights that warrant a top-down imposition. I am sure that our Reformist zeal is not blinded enough to see it that way, but there may be some who would still want to point that women forced to be behind the veil are living a less dignified life, and the situation according to the chosen parameters warrants imposition of the ban. I would like to argue that by forcing the issue of the hijab ban, it is the Reformist who is stealing the chance of a Muslim woman to live a dignified life. By forcing the issue, they are preparing a ground for many Muslim orthodox parents to not let their daughters see the corridors of schools and colleges and pushing the women who have autonomously adopted the practice to avoid such spaces. The Reformist enthusiasm of the hijab ban advocates is most likely to end up stealing a girl child’s right to education, her probably only chance to get out of this vicious trap in which her parents are trapped, her only chance to question her socio-cultural conditioning and associated cognitive biases, her only chance to make a decision for herself whether she wants to be behind the veil or not. Thus, at least to me, the Reformist demand for a ban on hijab and similar practices is unjust and uncalled for, and consensus mode seems to be the way forward. Consensus mode appears to be the way forward, but… Thus, the Reformists, if they are honest in their attempt to bring reforms, ought to pay more attention to devise ways to bring consensus amongst all the stakeholders. The essence of following this path lies in understanding what is central to building consensus . Central to any consensus building attempt, it can be argued, lies our ability to forge a constructive dialogue around the issues that require consensus. Any dialogue, as we all know, is composed of arguments, a logic-driven structure where claims are supported by premises. Likewise, the strength of the argument lies in its validity and soundness, where the truth of the premises plays a significant part. The question is where do these premises come from? In a society where education is still struggling to penetrate and expand its reach, it’s unreasonable to assume that their premises are likely to represent facts or truth by empirical standards. Most likely, socio-cultural conditionings, various forms of custom and tradition enforced beliefs or some form of authority are the general sources of many of their premises. What makes matters further complex is that almost all the sections of our society, in varying degrees, subscribe to such premises where each of these sections has its own sets of customs, traditions, social-conditioning, and authorities. A dialogue is probably difficult to conceive in a situation where participating members or sections of society appeal to different grounds of truth for many of their premises in the arguments advanced by them . Thus, what we get is a stalemate in return, and our Reformist zeal, instead of recognizing the true nemesis and finding a solution to it, pushes for the quick fixes , often in the form of top-down insensitive impositions as it can be witnessed in the context of the call for hijab ban. What a Reformist needs to do instead is to find a way to push through this stalemate and ensure that the dialogue happens , but how can they do it? The stumbling block in the dialogues seems to be ‘ the different grounds for truth ’ of their premises, but can we ensure uniformity in it. My preferred criteria would be empirical facts for obvious reasons, but can we push for it? I think we should not. Then what should be done? My take is that we ought to focus on the prospective participants in the dialogue, i.e. children and in them inculcate the skill of reflectivity . From reflectivity what I mean is the ability to challenge one’s own beliefs and those of others, the ability to seek justification for such beliefs and keep such justifications under constant scrutiny, the ability to identify fallacies and cognitive biases and the ability to overcome the conditionings enforced by the accident of birth. Given the fact that they are able to question themselves with the same intensity that they question others, participants of this kind in a dialogue are more likely to come up with some agreeable common grounds of truth for their premises and make their dialogue and consequently reforms more successful. One may ask why children alone? I am not pessimistic in this regard, but I have come to understand that, barring a few exceptions, the grown-up population is way too conditioned (even the educated ones) to give upon their rigidities. Efforts can nevertheless be made in this direction. What is it that the Reformists should do to actualise the foregoing? Considering that they are true in their intent to reform the society, and want to put an end to regressive practices without causing much of a social discord and discontentment, they should spend their energies in creating and shaping an education system that promotes reflectivity of the kind stated above in the students at the grass-root level. I am not implying here that all our social and cultural problems will be resolved once our citizenry is educated in the stated manner. It would be naïve to think so given the complexities at play, and I don’t intend to underappreciate the human tenacity to abandon reason when it suits them, but with all that could be there to impede dialogue, by adopting this course, surely we will give ourselves the best chance to reform our society without inciting social discord. These are my well-considered views, but I can be naïve in such considerations. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Read other articles in this series: Ariba Zaidi -- A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist’ Danish Hamid -- Back to Liberal Basics Hina Mushtaq -- Can women decide for themselves? Sania Ismailee -- The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education...

Traditional vs Colonial: Navigating Dichotomies of Philosophy in India Ankita Kushwaha and Megha Kapoor PhD scholars, Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University (respectively) and Teaching Fellows, Sai University Dec 14, 2023 The realm of philosophy in India has diverse thinking traditions reflecting a blend of orthodox, heterodox, and various local cultural ideologies. Contemporary scholars find themselves caught in a pronounced dichotomy in the engagement with traditions, primarily shaped by historical forces. They are either charged for aligning with glorifying traditional concepts or critiqued for viewing the tradition through a colonial lens. Here, we seek to explore the challenges faced by contemporary philosophers of India while engaging with the philosophical concepts embedded in various traditional sources. We argue that in engaging with these concepts, philosophers are required to address the challenges posed by the above-mentioned dichotomous relationship. Moreover, as we navigate this dichotomy, our primary purpose is to stress the importance of thoroughly looking into traditional ideas. Noteworthily, in many instances, scholars accept the text without critical analysis and provide justifications that contribute to the glorification. In light of this, our primary objective is to emphasise an urgent need for a more rigorous and discerning philosophical inquiry that furthers the development of a more detailed understanding of the traditional ways of thinking. The Importance of Engaging with Traditional Ideologies How we perceive ourselves individually and socially is impacted by the environment in which we are born and grow. Any theorisation, therefore, cannot be in isolation. The theorisation must have an understanding of our traditions and local norms; at the same time, it must encompass our present lived experiences (Guru and Sarukkai 2012). Understanding various traditional sources is essential because they encompass the lived experiences of the past, which continue to shape our present experiences. The term "traditional" is often used to describe generational practices, values, and customs. These sources manifest in classical texts, typically composed in dominant languages like Sanskrit and Persian (Chandhoke 2019, 80), offering well-structured and organised insights into tradition. These local thoughts are embedded in diverse forms such as stories, folklore, fables, songs, and other cultural expressions. They not only provide a window into the historical aspects of a particular geographical location and community but also incorporate contemporary elements unique to their context. The recent discussion regarding the decolonisation of philosophy in India operates under the assumption that the colonisers have influenced the philosophical perspective. It necessitates a decolonisation effort to address the burden of Western thought that hinders the accurate representation of Indian intellectual traditions. However, the blame on colonisation from the perspective of Brahminism needs to be revisited. When colonisation occurred, Brahmins, well-versed in Sanskrit and holding higher positions, assisted the colonisers in shaping a new understanding of India, which led to the emergence of a form of Hindu philosophy that was dominantly Sanskritised, further resulting in the under-representation of thoughts from other traditions. Interestingly, despite being practised by a small portion of the population, Brahmanism managed to establish a subcontinental identity. Its popularity can be attributed to its ritual functions, ceremonies, and the adoption of Sanskrit as a common language (Thapar 1989, 209–231). The Dichotomy of Traditional vs Colonial The texts and ideologies of India represent various philosophical thoughts that provide insight into the intricate fabric of Indian society. Engaging with these texts and ideologies in a contemporary context allows for a deeper understanding of cultural heritage, providing a platform for critical dialogue. While acknowledging their historical roots, scholars must avoid absolutism to promote further an evaluative approach accommodating evolving perspectives. Therefore, in contemporary times, a conscious effort exists to critique colonial impact on philosophy in India by reviving and re-evaluating indigenous thought systems. However, the challenge lies in avoiding oversimplification and essentialisation. This task becomes even more complex, considering that many Indian intellectuals predominantly come from upper-caste backgrounds. This background gives them a privilege that does not necessitate them to critically examine their inherited traditions (Nanda 2010, 185). Consequently, this lack of critical examination from a segment of the intellectual elite further complicates the nuanced process of re-evaluating and revitalising philosophical traditions in India in the post-colonial context. This issue can be explored more closely by delving into the Mahabharata scholarship. When scholars discuss Mahabharata[1] as a foundational text for the Indian subcontinent, their use of terminologies and explanations may suggest that it is the greatest epic of all time for India. However, it is crucial to ask for whom it holds this esteemed position. Edward Dimock describes Mahabharata as the "founding library of Brahmin-Indian civilization," emphasising its role as an encyclopedia covering history, legend, edification, religion, art, drama, and morality specific to that civilisation (Dimock 1974, 53). Janaky adds another layer to this perspective, highlighting how the Bhrgus or Brahmins asserted authority over social, political, and moral realms not by controlling princes but through their influence on Mahabharata scholarship (Janaky 1992, 1997–1999). Overlooking this aspect universalises Mahabharata as a text for all, whereas, as Ambedkar points out, sacred texts of India contain a social philosophy responsible for the degradation of non-Brahmins (Ambedkar 2019, 393-395). Ambedkar further criticises the insufficient critical engagement with sacred literature, emphasising the detrimental impact of two contrasting attitudes: the uncritical commendation by a Brahmin scholar and the unsparing condemnation by a non-Brahmin. Both approaches, according to Ambedkar, hinder the progress of historical research ( ibid , 393). The disadvantage of such an approach is that either they miss the regressive ideas or articulate them in an oversimplified manner that ultimately glorifies the regressive Brahminical ideas. Therefore, there is a need for a more nuanced and critical examination of sacred texts to understand their implications on social history in the true sense. Moreover, another aspect of evaluation exists where scholars discard or appropriate various conceptions of Mahabharata because of evaluating certain aspects of the text from a colonial lens. For instance, German Indoligists interpreted Mahabharata as "framing Brahmans as 'priests,' and presenting themselves as reformers and liberators, while they collaborated with the Prussian (and later, Nazi) state" (Adluri 2016). As a response, a group of scholars in contemporary philosophy in India talk about the need for the revival of Indian traditional and religious thought. They hold that the modern liberal framework for conceptualising Indian society is the product of colonialism, as that has constantly undermined the significance of Indian traditional and religious thoughts. De Roover argues that even though liberalism "presents itself as a freestanding conception independent from any comprehensive doctrines or substantive conceptions of the good… [but] it continues to depend on a conception of the person and human social life that secularises protestant Christian ideas by transforming them into the topoi of political thought" (De Roover 2015, 237). Thus, he emphasises that Western liberal categories of thinking are not fruitful in conceptualising Indian society and polity as they are from different historical and political contexts. Even though the revival is significant and decolonisation requires discarding the underlying colonial mindset, the problem arose because of a similar pattern. There has been a constant effort to derive the themes or subjects of political thought from traditional ideas.[2] This pattern constrains critical engagement that further ends in accusing all liberal concepts as irrelevant to the Indian context (Nandy 1988, 189) merely because they are the products of Western civilisation (De Roover 2015, 234-239). Contrary to this, Patel says there is a need to engage with tradition without romanticising the past. She also emphasises that it should not also be a denial of all modern concepts. Thus, Patel emphasises a decolonial approach, which is "not a retrieval of premodern assessments that would consist of a folkloric affirmation of the past, nor an antimodern project of the kind put forward by conservative, right-wing, populist or fascist groups, nor a postmodern project that would deny modernity and would critique all reason" (Patel 2020, 10-11). Further, she suggests that there is a need for a new approach to social theorisation that critiques the Western conceptual framework through the inclusion of the experiences of the people. Additionally, the problem in reviving the traditional ideas is that India today no longer has the same structure as it used to have earlier. Various traditional concepts are not relevant in the theorisation of contemporary society. It is crucial today to theorise the contemporary issues along with the lived experiences of the ordinary masses. At the same time, we cannot accept the colonial framework without analysing its relevance to the lived experiences of the masses. When accepted without critical analysis, a philosophical inquiry may result in the glorification of either of the categories (traditional or liberal). The need is to not unquestioningly accept or discredit the traditional norms as well as the liberal frameworks of thinking altogether. Conclusion Navigating the dichotomies of glorification of tradition vs colonial mindsets presents a challenge for contemporary scholars. The revival of philosophy in India should not be limited to a mere glorification of tradition but should involve critical analysis that engages with the complexity and dynamism of the philosophical heritage. Therefore, a few critical questions arise in the discourse of philosophy today: what approach is suitable for philosophy in India? How can we decolonise philosophy without glorifying the past? What are its challenges? How will these challenges be resolved? Answering these questions necessitates a deep understanding of the challenges posed by the dichotomy. Hence, further research is imperative to engage with these intricate philosophical inquiries, offering a more comprehensive approach to the decolonisation of philosophy in India. [1] In reference to the Mahabharata, it’s important to note that there are multiple versions. Here, we specifically refer to the ancient Mahabharata of Krishna Dvaipayana, also known as Veda Vyasa. Our focus, in this context, pertains solely to the philosophical aspects of the text. [2] As de Roover argues that liberal ideas are the topoi of Protestant Christian ideas, various Indian political concepts are also topoi of Indian Tradition. For instance, in Gandhi’s thought, secularism refers to sarvadhrama sambhava. The idea of sarvadharma sambhava is rooted in the idea that the truth has many sides and cannot be grasped by human beings completely. Therefore, according to Gandhi, we should respect all conceptions of the good (see Gandhi 1995). References Adluri, Vishwa. 2016. “How We Should Approach The Phenomenon Of Studying Hinduism.” Swarajya , https://swarajyamag.com/culture/how-we-should-approach-the-phenomenon-of-studying-hinduism . Ambedkar, B.R. 2019. The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar , edited by V. Rodrigues. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chandhoke, Neera. 2019. Rethinking Pluralism, Secularism, and Tolerance: Anxieties of Coexistence . New Delhi: Sage Publication. De Roover, Jakob. 2015. Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dimock, Edward. 1974. The Literatures of India: An Introduction . University of Chicago. Gandhi, M.K. 1995. Hindu Dharma . New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks. Guru, Gopal, and Sarukkai, Sundar. 2012. The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory . New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Janaky. 1992. “On the Trail of the Mahabharata: A Response.” Economic and Political Weekly 27 (37): 1997–1999. Nanda, Meera. 2010. “Arguments for an Indian Enlightenment.” In Indian Political Thought : A Reader , edited by A. Singh and S. Mohapatra, 175–186. Routledge. Nandy, Ashis. 1988. “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 13 (2): 177–194. Patel, Sujata. 2020. “Social Theory Today: Eurocentrism and Decolonial Theory.” Madras Institute of Development Studies . Accessed November 8, 2023. https://www.mids.ac.in/assets/doc/WP_240.pdf . Thapar, Romila. 1989. “Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity.” Modern Asian Studies 23 (2): 209–231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/312738 .

Academic writing support for philosophers in India IPN Writing Centre An important aspect of philosophers’ work is writing and publishing. It is also one of the areas that doctoral scholars and young researchers often find the hardest and have the least support for. IPN Writing Centre aims to address this gap through Writing Mentorship and Writing Rooms . Writing Mentorship This initiative is aimed at supporting researchers who would like to receive the guidance and feedback of peers on drafts of their written work (such as a research article or a thesis chapter). While many of us get feedback on our written work from our supervisors, advisory committee members and other senior faculty, it might be useful to have peers read and comment on them. For one, this provides a less ‘formal’ and freer environment, where Ph.D. scholars and others may feel more comfortable discussing their concerns and asking for feedback. How it works Interested people, who would like to have their work reviewed, will have to register and indicate the area in which their written work is situated. Based on the area of their work, each registrant will be assigned a mentor by the IPN coordinators. This would take approximately 1-2 weeks. The registrant will be introduced to the mentor, and can share their work with them.The mentor will read the registrant’s work and provide them written feedback within 3 weeks. Depending on the preference of the mentor and the registrant, they may want to meet and discuss the feedback and comments. The first round of feedback will be coordinated by the IPN coordinator. The registrant and mentor can have further rounds of discussion and feedback based on their requirement and preference. Who can apply : Philosophers in India (Ph.D. scholars and above) can apply. Even M.A. scholars who wish to work towards publication of their papers can also apply. Membership of IPN is not necessary. How to apply: Those who would like to receive feedback on their work, please register here . Coordinators : Siddharth S (siddharth.nias[at]gmail.com) and Varun Bhatta (varunsbhatta[at]gmail.com) IPN Writing Rooms This initiative aims at creating virtual meeting rooms for researchers who wish to write on a regular basis but haven't been able to execute it properly. IPN Writing Rooms will provide a shared space and would be of particular interest to those who like to have company while they are writing. Who can apply : Philosophers in India (Ph.D. scholars and above) can apply. Membership of IPN is not necessary. How to apply: Interested candidates, please register here . Coordinators : Jinesh Sheth (jineshrsheth13[at]gmail.com) and Siddharth S (siddharth.nias[at]gmail.com)

Parichay Parichay (which means "to get acquainted" in some Indian languages) is an attempt to know other philosophers in the IPN community. This series of interviews provide a glimpse of philosophers' work and their views about the discipline. With time, this anthology of conversations hopes to become an archive of the practice of philosophy in India. Hareesh A G Richa Shukla Jinesh Sheth Srajana Kaikini Muzaffar Ali Tarun Kattumana Proposals to interview philosophers in India are invited. Please reach out to moderators (indianphilosophynetwork[at]gmail.com ).

IPN Blog IPN blo g is a platform for philosophers and others to write about philosophy in India and also to express philosophically informed opinions. Given the aim of the IPN blog is to enable a dialogue between philosophers and the public, both philosophers and the public can submit articles. See the submission guidelines . What Responsibility? Whose Responsibility? Read the article Bhaskarjit Neog Feb 7, 2024 Review of Venusa Tinyi's book by Aribam Uttam Sharma Read the article Aribam Uttam Sharma Dec 28, 2023 Traditional vs Colonial: Navigating Dichotomies of Philosophy in India Read the article Ankita Kushwaha and Megha Kapoor Dec 14, 2023 Review of Meera Baindur's novel by Manish Sharma Read the article Manish Sharma Nov 24, 2023 Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Richa Shukla Read the article Richa Shukla Nov 13, 2023 Review of Muzaffar Ali's book by Satya Javvaji Read the article Satya Javvaji Oct 26, 2023 Philosophy Education and Job Competencies Read the article Nishant Kumar Nov 6, 2022 Translating philosophy: DR Nagaraj's Allamaprabhu Read the article N S Gundur Jul 3, 2022 A Word of Caution to 'the Uniformist' and 'the Reformist' Read the article Ariba Zaidi Feb 22, 2022 The Karnataka Hijab row is about Right to Education, not Freedom of Religion Read the article Sania Ismailee Feb 22, 2022 Back to Liberal Basics Read the article Danish Hamid Feb 22, 2022 Can women decide for themselves? Read the article Hina Mushtaq Feb 22, 2022

Parichay Parichay (which means "to get acquainted" in some Indian languages) is an attempt to know other philosophers in the IPN community. This series of interviews provide a glimpse of philosophers' work and their views about the discipline. With time, this anthology of conversations hopes to become an archive of the practice of philosophy in India. Hareesh A G Richa Shukla Jinesh Sheth Srajana Kaikini Muzaffar Ali Tarun Kattumana Proposals to interview philosophers in India are invited. Please reach out to moderators (indianphilosophynetwork[at]gmail.com ).